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INTRODUCTION

The profession is experiencing a dramatic decrease in
loyalty, both of law firm employers to lawyers and of associates
and partners to the law firms. This decline in reciprocal loyalties
has led to increasing lawyer mobility. Both sides, the departing
lawyer and the law firm, have critical commercial interests at
stake, and both sides are strongly motivated to protect them.
Departing lawyers hope that their clients depart with them to
provide the basis for a new practice, and the firms seek to retain
clients with the firm. On one side, departing lawyers are
exploring how far they can go to solicit clients before and after
separation from the firm. On the other side, to prevent or
inhibit departing lawyers from taking clients from the firm, many
firms are experimenting with how far they can go to discourage
competition for clients by departing lawyers. The objective is to
let a firm's lawyers know that there will be immediate and
serious negative consequences if a lawyer leaves and goes into
competition with the firm.
There is some evidence that many lawyers may not know
about the Rules of Professional Conduct1 that apply to agreements that restrict the practice of departing lawyers, 2 but in any
event, the firms have very strong commercial incentives to push
the outer edge of the envelope on these issues. This article
focuses on how far firms can go to discourage competition for
clients by departing lawyers. Given scarce prosecutorial resources, it appears that lawyer disciplinary authorities are likely to
pursue only egregious violations involving actual prohibitions
against a lawyer's right to practice.' They do not investigate
indirect restraints on the right to practice. These are played out
in the litigation that law firms and departing lawyers presently
enjoy. Among the charges and countercharges will often be a

1.

Unless stated otherwise, textual references in this paper are to the MODEL

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr (Rule) or to the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY (DR).
2. A survey of 20 New York City law firms in 1988 indicated that while one-half
have some form of direct or indirect noncompete agreement, only two of the twenty
partners interviewed had heard of Rule 5.6 or its equivalent, DR 2-108(A). See Steven
Brill, The PartnerBreakup Follies, AM. LAWYER, March 1988, at 3.
3. Interview with Ken Jorgenson, Assistant Director of the Minnesota Lawyers
Board of Professional Responsibility, in Minneapolis, Minnesota (Feb. 5, 1996).
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claim that the law firm's withholding of a benefit to a departing
lawyer is an indirect restraint on the right to practice. Since
such litigation is exploding, Rule 5.6 is becoming more important. Part II of the article outlines first the current rule against
restrictions on the right to practice and Part III then analyzes the
policy rationale for this current rule. Part IV explores the
degree to which the law governing lawyers permits agreements
that indirectly inhibit or discourage competition. Part V looks
at recent cases in California endorsing agreements discouraging
competition by departing lawyers because the practice of law is
held to be a business enterprise whose interests can be protected
as other businesses are permitted to protect their interests. Parts
VI and VII analyze the exceptions both for restrictions on the
right to practice coupled with "benefits upon retirement," and
for fee splitting pursuant to a separation agreement. Part VIII
looks at Rule 1.17 and its permission for a restriction on the
right to practice incident to the sale of a practice in its entirety.
Part IX concludes by arguing in support of a bright-line rule
prohibiting direct or indirect restrictions on the right to practice.
The principal theme of this analysis is that the profession should
not permit the battle among commercial interests of departing
lawyers and law firms to compromise the profession's historic
commitment to client choice as an overriding policy objective.
II.

THE CURRENT RULE AGAINST RESTRICTIONS
ON THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE

The Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6 on
restrictions on the right to practice provides as follows:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: (a) a
partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights
of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship,
except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement;
or (b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's
right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy
between private parties.4
The 1985 Comment adds the following:
An agreement restricting the right of partners or
associates to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their
professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients

4.

MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6 (1996).
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to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements
except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning
retirement benefits from service with the firm.
Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to
represent other persons in connection with settling a claim
5
on behalf of a client.
The 1995 Comment adds further that "This Rule does not
prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the
sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17. " 6
Rules 1.5 on fees and 1.17 on the sale of law practice also
relate to the issue of restrictions on the right to practice.
Minnesota Rule 1.5(e) and 1.5(f) on fees provide the following:
(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same
firm may be made only if: (1) the division is in proportion to
the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility
for the representation; (2) the client is advised of the share
that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the
participation of all the lawyers involved; and (3) the total fee
is reasonable.7
(f) This Rule does not prohibit payment to a former partner
or associate pursuant to a separation agreement.8
Rule 1.17 on the sale of a law practice, effective in Minnesota on
January 1, 1996, provides in relevant part:
(a) A lawyer shall not sell or buy a law practice unless: (1)
The seller sells the practice as an entirety, as defined in
paragraph (c) of this Rule, to a lawyer or firm of lawyers
licensed to practice law in Minnesota; (2) The seller sends a
written notification that complies with paragraph (d) of this
Rule to all clients whose files are currently active and all
clients whose inactive files will be taken over by the buying
lawyer or firm of lawyers.
(f) The transaction may include a promise by the selling
lawyer that the selling lawyer will not engage in the practice
of law for a reasonable period of time within a reasonable
geographic area and will not advertise for or solicit clients
within that area for that time.9
5.

MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6, 1985 cmt. (1996).

6. Id.
7. MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1996).
8. MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(f) (1996).
9. MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.17 (1996).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss4/6

4

1996]

Hamilton: Are We a Profession or Merely a Business? The Erosion of Rule 5.6
ARE WE A PROFESSION OR MERELY A BUSINESS?

III.

1413

POLICY RATIONALE FOR RULE 5.6

A. Freedom of Clients to Select Counsel of Choice
Despite the wording of Rule 5.6 in terms of the lawyer's
right to practice, the history of the rule reveals that its purpose
is to ensure the freedom of clients to select counsel of their
choice. The rule is intended to serve the public interest by
ensuring a client's maximum choice among lawyers. When a
lawyer leaves a firm, the focus of the rule is that the affected
clients have the right to decide for themselves which lawyer they
wish to handle their affairs without interference by commercial
arrangements among the lawyers. Both sets of lawyers must be able
to compete openly for the business of the clients they once
served. ' The wording of Rule 5.6 is similar to that of DR 2-108
in the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. DR 2-108 provides as follows:
(A) A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a
partnership or employment agreement with another lawyer
that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law after the
termination of a relationship created by the agreement,
except as a condition to payment of retirement benefits.
(B) In connection with the settlement of a controversy or
suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement that restricts
his right to practice law. 1
Because the language is so similar, cases interpreting DR 2108(A) are relevant in interpreting Rule 5.6.
A secondary policy rationale for Rule 5.6 mentioned in the
comment is that an agreement restrictiong lawyers' rights to
practice also "limited their professional autonomy."12 This
rationale of protecting a lawyer's professional autonomy is
occasionally cited but is clearly secondary to the principle of the

10. See Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989); Jacob v.
Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 146 (NJ. 1992); see also GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT 824, 824.5 (2nd ed. Supp. 1996) (explaining that if
lawyers are not permitted to compete openly for the business of clients, "client choice"
becomes an empty idea).
11. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-108 (1969) in THOMAS
MORGAN & RONALD ROTUNDA, 1995 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 173.
12. MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 5.6, 1985 cmt (1996).
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freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. 13
B. Commercial Standards Relating to Restrictive Covenants Are Not
Applicable in the Lauyer-Client Context
Lawyer restrictive covenants must be distinguished from
both commercial noncompetitive covenants by the seller incident
to the sale of an enterprise and the general category of agreements restricting post-employment competition by former
employees. In both cases, the noncompetitive covenants are
designed to protect the goodwill and business of the buyer of an
enterprise or of the employer against various forms of competition. Historically, the seller's noncompetitive agreement was
more freely enforceable than the employee restrictive covenant;
the latter was subject to a stricter test of reasonableness under
the circumstances. 4 An early New Jersey case on the issue of
lawyer restrictive covenants, Dwyer v. Jung,5 found that an
employee's restrictive covenant "will generally be found to be
reasonable where it simply protects the legitimate interests of the
employer, imposes no undue hardship on the employee, and is
not injurious to the public."16
The Dwyer court further explains:
Commercial standards may not be used to evaluate the
13. See ABA Formal Opinion 94-381, Restrictions on Right to Practice (May 8,
1994) (considering restrictions on the right to practice of in-house counsel). But see
Committee on Professional Responsibility, Association of the Bar of City of New York,
Ethical Issues Arising When aLawyer Leaves a Firm: Restrictionson Practice,20 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 897, 909 (1993) (stating "[tihe major justification for the rule is to promote a
lawyer's personal autonomy by allowing the lawyer some freedom of movement").
However, this article has not been cited by any court to date as authority for an
exception to the principle of client choice as the primary policy underlying the ethical
ban.
14. See B&Y Metal Painting, Inc. v. Ball 279 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Minn. 1979)
(recognizing that courts use a stricter standard when looking at employment
noncompete agreements than those of sellers); Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270
Minn. 525, 535, 134 N.W.2d 892, 899 (Minn. 1965) (stating the concern in the
employment cases is unequal bargaining power, thus a stricter standard); National
Recruiters, Inc., v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982) (expressing the
opinion that courts look with disfavor upon restrictive covenants between employees
and employer because of the partial restraint on trade).
15. 336 A.2d 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) affd 348 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1975).
16. Duyer,336 A.2d at 500 (quoting Solari Indus. v. Malody, 264 A.2d 53 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1970); see Glen S. Draper, Enforcing Lawyers' Covenants Not to Compete, 69 WASH. L.
REv. 161, 162-66 (1994) (discussing how non-compete covenants for attorneys differ
from those in other occupations).
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reasonableness of lawyer restrictive covenants. Strong policy
considerations preclude their applicability. In that sense
lawyer restrictions are injurious to the public interest. A
client is always entitled to be represented by counsel of his
The attorney client relationship is
own choosing ....
consensual, highly fiduciary on the part of counsel, and he
may do nothing which restricts the right of a client to repose
confidence in any counsel of his choice .... No concept in
the practice of law is more deeply rooted. The lawyer's
function is to serve, but serve he must with fidelity, devotion
in the highest traditions of his noble profesand erudition
17
sion."
These considerations have led to similar distinctions within
the Rules of Professional Conduct, where restrictions on the
right to practice of a former employee lawyer are held to a
stricter test under Rule 5.6 than restrictions on the right to
practice of a seller of a law practice under Rule 1.1718. Both
rules articulate standards for lawyers substantially higher than
general commercial standards. Both rules also recognize that
client choice is not a factor in situations where the departing
lawyer is no longer in practice in thejurisdiction, either through
the sale of the entire practice or upon retirement from the
practice. Restrictions on the right to practice permitted by Rule
1.17 and the Rule 5.6 exception for agreements upon retirement
are discussed later.
IV. THE REACH OF RULE 5.6
A. Agreements ProhibitingCompetition and Client Choice
Courts consistently find that Rule 5.6 and its precursor, DR
2-108(A), forbid outright prohibitions on the practice of law. 9
Agreements allocating clients, geographic areas, or types of
practice would all fall within this category. Contractual provisions that violate the Rules also violate public policy, and courts
deem them void and unenforceable.2 °

17.
18.
19.
20.

Duyer, 336 A.2d at 500.
Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 153 (N.J. 1992).
Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 146.
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B. Agreements DiscouragingCompetition and Client Choice
Can a firm discourage, rather than prohibit, competition for
clients by departing lawyers? Responding to a dramatic decrease
in reciprocal loyalties between firms and lawyers, and a corresponding increase in lawyer mobility, many firms have incorporated provisions into their employment agreements that impose
financial disincentives on lawyers who compete with their former
Rich in drafting skills, firms are utilizing a dazzling
firm. "
variety of creative financial disincentive provisions that require
a departing lawyer to forfeit all or a part of the earned departure, termination or deferred compensation that the lawyer
would have received were he or she not leaving to compete with
the firm. Firms are also adopting financial disincentives that
require a departing lawyer to pay to the former firm a percentage of the fees received from clients who leave with the lawyer.2" This second option is discussed in Part VII below. Both
of these types of provisions let a firm's lawyers know that there
will be immediate negative consequences if the lawyer leaves and
goes into competition with the firm.
Going into competition with the former firm requires
capital. Hazard and Hodes emphasize the necessity for an
Modern
immediate cash stream to launch a new firm. 3
practice is capital intensive and involves substantial cash flows.
At any given time, a law firm has a substantial number of hours
of time expended but not yet billed, and hours billed but not yet
collected. Simultaneously, the firm must pay its current wages,
rents, equipment costs and a host of other expenses. 24 Newer
lawyers with fewer overall assets will face the most significant
cash flow problems. For this group of lawyers in particular, trade
offs between loss of immediate cash because of financial
disincentive provisions and the25representation of clients that
triggers the loss will be difficult.
In the leading case on agreements that discourage competi-

21. See ROBERT HILLMAN, LAWYER MOBIUTY: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF PARTNER
WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS § 2.3.4 (1995).

22. See ABA & BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct (ABA & BNA)
51:1205 (1995).
23.

HAZARD & HODES, supra note 10, at 822-23.

24.
25.

Id.
Id. at 823.
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tion and client choice,2 6 the law firm, Norris, McLaughlin and
Marcus had a Service Termination Agreement that prohibited
departing lawyers from collecting termination compensation if
they continued to represent firm clients. 2 7 The court held that

the plain meaning of Rule 5.6 "indicates that any provision,
whether direct or indirect, that operates so as to restrict a
lawyer's post-termination practice will contravene the ethical
rule."

28

Any provision penalizing an attorney for undertaking certain
representation restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law
within the meaning of [Rule 5.6].
By forcing lawyers to choose between compensation and
continued service to their clients, financial-disincentive
provisions may encourage lawyers to give up their clients,
thereby interfering with the lawyer-client relationship and,
more importantly, with clients' free choice of counsel. Those
provisions thus cause indirectly the same objectionable
restraints on the free practice of law as more direct restrictive
covenants ....
Because the client's freedom of choice is the
paramount interest to be served by the [rule], a disincentive
provision is as detrimental to the public interest as an
outright prohibition. Moreover, if we were to prohibit direct
restraints on practice but permit indirect restraints, law firms
would quickly 2 9move to undermine [Rule] 5.6 through
indirect means.
The court emphasizes that the details of a provision
affecting a departing lawyer are not the important question. The
critical question is "the effect of the terms of payment on the
lawyer's decision to decline or accept those clients who wish to
choose him or her as counsel. If the agreement creates a
disincentive to accept representation, it violates [Rule 5.6]."3
The focus of analysis has to be on the practical effect of the
financial disincentive provision.31
The New York Court of Appeals comes to a similar holding
in another leading case, Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord. 2 The Lord,

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992).
Id. at 144-45.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 148.
550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989).
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Day and Lord (LD&L)
[P]artnership agreement included a provision protecting
against automatic dissolution and recognized that withdrawing
partners were entitled to a share of the firm profits representing unpaid fees, and fees for services performed but not yet
billed, at the time of departure. In order to avoid the
expense and bookkeeping complication of a detailed accounting, the agreement provided for departure payment, based on
a formula, to be paid over a three-year period.
When Cohen requested his departure compensation,
LD&L refused to pay, stating that Cohen had forfeited the
money by electing to continue to practice law in competition
with the firm. In support of its position, the defendant firm
relied on the forfeiture-for-competition clause of the partnership agreement: "Notwithstanding anything in this Article *
* * to the contrary, if a Partner withdraws from the Partnership and without the prior written consent of the Executive
Committee continues to practice law in any state or otherjurisdiction in which the Partnershipmaintains an office or any contiguous

jurisdiction, either as a lawyer in private practice or as a
counsel employed by a business firm, he shall have no further
interest in and there shall be paid to him no proportion of the net
profits of the Partnership collected thereafter, whether for services
rendered before or after his withdrawal There shall be paid to

him only his withdrawable credit balance on the books of the
Partnership at the date of his withdrawal, together with the
amount of his capital account, and the Partnership shall have
no further obligation to him."
We hold that while the provision in question does not
expressly or completely prohibit a withdrawing partner from
engaging in the practice of law, the significant monetary
penalty it exacts, if the withdrawing partner practices competitively with the former firm, constitutes an impermissible
restriction on the practice of law. The forfeiture-for-competition provision would functionally and realistically discourage
and foreclose a withdrawing partner from serving clients who
might wish to continue to be represented by the withdrawing
lawyer and would thus interfere with the client's choice of
counsel 3.
A number of courts have similarly rejected indirect financial

33.

Id.at410-11.
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incentives that discourage competition and limit choice. 4
There are no Minnesota appellate decisions directly
considering financial disincentive provisions. However, in Barna,
Guzy & Steffen v. Beens,35 the Minnesota Court of Appeals

recently considered a separation agreement that required a
departing lawyer to pay to the former firm fifty percent of all
fees eventually recovered in contingent fee cases the lawyer
handled while at the Bama law firm. 6 In the particular
contingency fee case at hand, there was already a fee split with
a third lawyer outside the Barna firm. The court properly found
that
The focus of our decision is the client. As the court stated in
Jacob- The history behind [rule 5.6] and its precursors reveals

34. SeeWhiteside v. Griffis & Griffis, P.C., 902 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)
(an agreement under which attorney is given an indirect financial disincentive to
practice law violates the Professional Responsibility Code Provision that bars agreements
restricting right of attorney to practice law and is void as against public policy); Leonard
& Butler, P.C. v. Harris, 653 A.2d 1193, 1198 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (holding
indirect financial disincentive should be closely scrutinized because of the potential for
interference in the attorney-client relationship); Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau &
Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 998 (N.Y. 1993) (holding financial disincentives are restrictions
on the practice of law and are objectionable because they interfere with the client's
choice of counsel); Minge v. Weeks, 629 So.2d 545, 547 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (indirect
financial disincentives, even though not directly restrictive, violate Rule 5.6); Anderson
v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1990)
(recognizing the transparency of the distinction between an indirect financial
disincentive and a restrictive covenant);Judge v. Bartlett, Potiff, Stewart & Rhodes P.C.,
197 A.D.2d 148, 149 (N.Y. 1994) (the primary reason that indirect financial
disincentives are objectionable is the interference they pose to a client's choice of
counsel); Weiss v. Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, 646 A.2d 473, 479 (NJ. Super. CL
App. Div. 1994) (agreeing with previous courts that held indirect financial disincentives
are unenforceable as against public policy); Katchen v. Wolff & Samson, 610 A.2d 415,
419 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1992) (holding if a financial disincentive has the effect
of discouraging competitive activities, even if indirectly, such a provision violates rule
5.6 of the rules of professional conduct); Gray v. Martin, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290 (Or. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that forfeiture of retirement benefits affects the withdrawing
partner's right to practice in violation of the rule of professional responsibility); Hagen
v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, P.C., 683 P.2d 563, 565 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (a forty percent
reduction in stock redemption price affects the departing lawyer's right to practice law
and is unenforceable); Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 530
(Tenn. 1991) (forfeiture of deferred compensation by prior agreement is unenforceable
as against public policy); In re Silverberg, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481-82 (N.Y. 1980) (eighty
percent of fees from ex-clients of other lawyer in dissolving firm for eighteen months
after termination is void as it violates the rules of professional conduct and is contrary
to public policy).
35. 541 N.W.2d 354 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev. den. (Minn. Feb. 1996).
36. Id. at 355.
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that the [rule's] underlying purpose is to ensure the freedom
of clients to select counsel of their choice, 7despite its wording
in terms of the lawyer's right to practice.
The court distinguished the Barna separation agreement
[F]rom one in which a separation agreement effectively
penalizes an attorney for continuing to represent certain
clients. Under the shareholder agreement, Beens will still
receive 50% of the contingency fee. As the Barna firm points
out, the agreement cannot serve as a financial disincentive
because Beens would have received less than 50% of the
contingency fee if he had remained at the firm."8
The court found there was no incentive for the departing lawyer
representation of clients subject to this fee splitting
to terminate
39
agreement.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals uses the correct analytical
framework focusing on the effect of the terms of payment on the
departing lawyer's decision to decline or accept those clients who
choose the lawyer as counsel. However, the court does not
properly apply the analysis to the facts. The court fails to
analyze the market reality of splitting a fee under the circumstances. A simple example clarifies the point. Assume that the
case at issue is expected to settle at $100,000, that the contingency fee is thirty percent, and that there is no third lawyer to split
the fee. The contingency fee will be $30,000, and the Barna
firm had incurred approximately $6,700 in attorney time on the
case at the time Beens left the firm. The critical missing
element in the court's analysis is how much more time the case
will take before settlement. If the case is expected to require
$23,000 more in attorney time, then the Barna firm will get
$15,000 less $6,700 in attorney time for a net profit of $8,300,
and Beens will get $15,000 but invest $23,000 in attorney time
for a net loss of $8,000. Thus, Beens would not take the case
If Minnesota courts
because of the financial disincentive.
continue to conclude that there is no disincentive to choose a
client simply because a departing lawyer receives at least as much
as the lawyer would have under the partnership agreement, the
courts are essentially permitting firms to adopt a type of "no
extra compensation rule" from partnership law in the partner-

37.
38.
39.

Id. at 357.
Id.
Id.
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ship agreements. The agreements will provide that a departing
lawyer can earn only their partnership interest on cases taken
from the firm. This will be a severe disincentive for departing
lawyers to take the client in some cases because the compensation does not reflect the cost of the case.
If the focus of Rule 5.6 is on the client's freedom to select
counsel of choice, then the analysis of fee splitting in separation
agreements must be more nuanced to ensure client choice. The
incentive for firms to create a financial disincentive for departing
lawyers is enormous. General commercial standards of liquidated damages or the "no extra compensation rule" of partnership
law will not be appropriate to achieve the purpose of protecting
client choice.
V. THE PRACTICE OF LAW AS A BUSINESS
AND THE EROSION OF RULE

A.

5.6

The California Supreme Court EndorsesAgreements Discouraging
Competition

In Howard v. Babcock,' the partnership agreement for the
law firm of Parker, Stanbury, McGee, Babcock & Combs
provided that if an attorney withdrew from the firm prior to age
sixty-five and thereafter within a period of one year practices
insurance defense work in Los Angeles or Orange County, the
attorney would forfeit all rights to withdrawal benefits other than
capital.4 The agreement provided that a partner who withdraws from the firm and does not compete would be paid a sum
equal to the share in the net profit of the firm that the withdrawn partner would have received if he or she had remained at
the firm during the twelve month period.42 After several
partners left the firm to handle among other cases, insurance
defense work in Los Angeles, the firm tendered payment to the
departing lawyers for their share of the capital of the firm, but
40.
41.

863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1993).
Id. at 151; see also Schlesinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d

650, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (indicating that a reduction in a partner's compensation
upon resignation was valid and reasonable); Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior
Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845, 848 (Cal. CL App. 1991); Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin &
Marcus, 588 A.2d 1287 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1991), rev'd 607 A.2d 142 (NJ. 1992)
(holding that linking severance payments for departing attorneys to the promise not to
solicit clients was not a violation of public policy).
42. Howard, 863 P.2d at 151.
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refused to compensate them for the accounts receivable or work
in progress of the law firm.'
The California Supreme Court
held that "an agreement among law partners imposing a
reasonable toll on departing partners who compete with the
firm" is enforceable." It remanded to the trial court to determine whether under the facts of this case, the terms of the
agreement are reasonable. 45
Rule 1-500 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct' is similar to Rule 5.6. It provides that a lawyer shall not
participate in offering or making an agreement that restricts the
right to practice law, except that the rule does not prohibit an
agreement which requires payments upon a lawyer's retirement
from the practice of law.47
The California Supreme Court interpreted this rule in light
of "our recognition that a revolution in the practice of law has
occurred requiring economic interests of the law firm to be
protected as they are in other business enterprises."'
Noting
(1) the decline of the loyalty of lawyers to the law firm (but not
the decline of firm loyalty to lawyers), (2) the increasing
propensity of withdrawing lawyers to set up competing practices
and to take clients of the firm, and (3) the increasing use of
noncompetition clauses in partnership agreements "in defiance
of the consistent holding of many courts across the nation that
a noncompetition clause violates the rules of professional
conduct . . .," the court concluded that "these agreements
address important business interests of law firms that can no
longer be ignored." 49 "Recognizing these sweeping changes in
the practice of law, we can see no legal justification for treating
partners in law firms differently in this respect from partners in
other businesses and professions."5 0 Further the court states,
[T] he contemporary changes in the legal profession to which
we have already alluded make the assertion that the practice

43. Id. at 152.
44. Id. at 160.
45. Id. at 161. The case was remanded a second time to the trial court to consider
further evidence on whether the agreement was reasonable. Howard v. Babcock, 46
Cal. Rptr.2d 907, 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
46. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-500 (1996).
47. Id. However, the rule noted three exceptions to this rule. See id.
48. Howard, 863 P.2d at 156-57.
49.
50.

Id. at 157.
Id.
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of law is not comparable to a business unpersuasive and
unreflective of reality. Commercial concerns are now openly
recognized as important in the practice of law ....

[A]s in

other businesses, lawyers may now advertise their services .... Thus the general rules and habits of commerce have
permeated the legal profession.5 1
A number of commentatorsjoin in endorsing the reasoning
of the California courts in Howard v. Babcock or the earlier
A
Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Cour5 2 decisions.
principal theme of this commentary is that the courts should
recognize the competing interests of the client, the law firm and
the withdrawing lawyers and balance them in a reasonableness
test as courts do in analyzing agreements discouraging competition in other professions. The legal profession is becoming
more of a business, and there is no distinction between the legal
professions and other professions. 3
B. Maine Subjects Agreements Restrictingthe Right to Practice Only
to the Commercial Law Limitations on Such Restrictions
Maine has gone further and did not adopt the Rule 5.6 or
DR 2-108 into its ethics rules. A Maine law firm may require its
lawyers to agree not to compete with the firm upon departure
subject only to commercial law limitations on such restrictions.54

51.

Id. at 159.

52.

285 Cal.Rtr. 845 (Cal. CL App. 1991).

53. See Kirsten Penasack, Note, Abandoning the Per Se Rule Against Law Firm
Agreements AnticipatingCompetition: Comment on Haight,Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles, 5 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHIcs 889, 908-09, 914 (1992); Serena L. Kafker, Golden
Handcuffs: Enforceability of Non-Competition Clauses in ProfessionalPartnershipAgreements of
Accountants, Physicians, and Attorneys, 31 AM. Bus. LJ. 31, 54-58 (1993); Glenn S. Draper,
Enforcing Lauyers' Covenants Not to Compete, 69 WASH L. REV. 161, 171-82 (1993);
Christopher D. Goble, Comment, You Can't Take It With You: Enforcing Noncompetition
Agreements Between Law Firms and Withdrawing Attorneys, 30 LAND & WATER L.REv. 179,
But see Julie A. Harris, Why Anti-Competitive Clauses Should Be
192-201 (1995).
Unenforceable In Law PartnershipAgreements: An Argument ForRejecting California'sApproach
in Howard v. Babcock, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 669, 686-690 (1995) (arguing for a
balancing approach that weights client choice more heavily).
54. Me. Ethics Op. 126 (1992), ABA & BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional
Conduct (ABA & BNA) 51:1207 (1996).
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AGREEMENTS CONCERNING "BENEFITS UPON
RETIREMENT" UNDER RULE 5.6

Minnesota Rule 5.6 provides that "A lawyer shall not
participate in offering or making: (a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice
after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning
55
benefits upon retirement."
Firms seeking to circumvent Rule 5.6 may label departure
or deferred compensation as a retirement benefit, and thus
claim that the rule does permit restrictions on a departing
lawyer's right to practice as a condition to the payment of the
retirement benefit.5 6 Courts have generally rejected these
attempts to categorize as "retirement" the departure of lawyers
who leave to practice elsewhere.
Courts recognize that the retirement exception must be
narrow and should not apply when lawyers withdraw to take up
practice elsewhere. However, decisions considering the definition of "an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement" do
not clearly identify the factors that should guide the determination. The phrase "benefits upon retirement" is itself not clearly
defined in Rule 5.6. However, "retirement" literally means
withdrawal from service, business or active duty usually after
many years of service or upon reaching a certain age. Given the
rule's policy rationale to protect the freedom of clients to select
counsel of choice, the phrase must mean upon withdrawal from
the active practice of law anywhere. There is no issue of client
choice if a lawyer is withdrawing from active practice, and the
restriction upon practice for retiring lawyers encourages firms to
55. MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 5.6. (1996) (emphasis added).
56. See Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 412-13 (N.Y. 1989).
57. See genera//y Graubard Mollen Horowitz etc. v. Moskovitz, 565 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that "a firm may... require an attorney not to
represent its clients or not to practice law at all while receiving retirement benefits, but
if the attorney decides to forgo those benefits, then he may practice and clients may
freely avail themselves of his services."); Levy v. Baumeister, 566 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1991) (holding that law partnership agreement that obligated withdrawing partners
to pay retiring partner value of receivables at retiring partner's retirement date did not
constitute impermissible restriction on practice of law); Miller v. Foulston, Siefin,
Powers etc., 790 P.2d 404 (Kan. 1990) (holding that provisions of law partnership
agreement that provided that an expelled partner is entitled to retirement benefit
payment as long as the expelled partner does not practice law and does not
impermissibly restrict the right to practice law).
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be generous with older lawyers who suffer a substantial drop in
income after leaving the practice.
If a firm can define retirement to mean the same thing as
58 recogwithdrawal or departure, the court in Gray v. Martin
nized that the disciplinary rule would have no meaning. "Every
termination of a relationship between law partners would be a
retirement and agreements restricting the right to practice would
always be allowed."59
There are several critical factors that must be met for a
restriction on the right to practice to fall within the Rule 5.6
exception for "an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement." First, the lawyer must be withdrawing from the active
practice of law anywhere and second, the agreement must
contain a minimum age and/or service requirement. Secondary
factors indicating an agreement concerning benefits upon
retirement would be an extended time period over which the
payments are made (indicating a true retirement), and the
existence of provisions dealing independently with withdrawal for
purposes of retirement and withdrawal for other reasons. 6°
VII.

PAYMENTS TO FORMER PARTNERS OR ASSOCIATES

PURSUANT TO A SEPARATION AGREEMENT UNDER RULE 1.5(F)

Under commercial standards set forth in the Uniform
Partnership Act (UPA),61 partners may enter into whatever
arrangement they like concerning the distribution of capital and
income after a partner's withdrawal and the partnership's
dissolution. In the event the partners make no provision, the
UPA's default policy is the "no extra-compensation" rule,
whereby the departing partner is paid no more than the normal
partnership share of fees for the work done on matters or cases
involving the winding up of the partnership business.6 2

58. 663 P.2d 1285 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
59. Id. at 1290.
60. See generaly ROBERT HILLMAN, LAWYER MOBILIY: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
PARTNER WITHDRAWAL AND LAW FIRM BREAKuPs, § 2.3.5 (1995) (discussing true
retirement versus more "departure" payments); HAZARD & HODES, supra note 10, at 824
(discussing covenants not to compete and restrictions on lawyers leaving a firm).
61. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18 (1949) (establishing default rules for
distribution of capital and income in the absence of an express agreement among the
parmers).
62. See generally Grossman v. Davis, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that bad faith action was part of winding up, requiring fee allocation to former
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The UPA does not supplant the Rules of Professional
Conduct and several provisions of the Rules are applicable to the
departing lawyer situation. A division of fees between lawyers
who are not in the same firm is subject to Rule 1.5(e), which
requires that (1) the division is in proportion to the services
performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the
client, each lawyer assumesjoint responsibility for the representation; (2) the client is advised of the share each lawyer is to
receive and does not object; and (3) the total fee is reasonable.
The Rules of Professional Conduct make no provision concerning the division of fees within a firm. This division will occur
according to the partnership agreement.'
Rule 1.5(f) focuses on the division of fees when a lawyer is
departing from a firm. It provides that, "This Rule does not
prohibit payment to a former partner or associate pursuant to a
separation agreement."' In other words, Rule 1.5(e) does not
govern with respect to a division of fees in a separation agreement with a departing lawyer.
Rule 5.6 prohibiting restrictions on the right to practice is
clearly still applicable to any separation agreement with a
departing lawyer. Rule 1.5(f) provides only that "this rule,"
meaning 1.5(e), does not prohibit payments to a departing
lawyer.
The division of fees on existing client matters that remain
with the firm or that go with the departing lawyer must not
impose financial disincentives on the departing lawyer or on the
firm that contravene the policy of Rule 5.6. The critical question
again is the effect of the terms of payment on either a departing
lawyer's or the firm's decision to decline or accept those clients
who wish to choose the lawyer or the firm as counsel. The terms

partners); Smith v. Daug, 365 N.W.2d 816 (Neb. 1985) (holding that fees for winding
up are to be distributed according to the agreement during the life of the partnership);
Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal.Rptr. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that fees received by
former partners were to be shared according to their right in the former partnership);
Resnick v. Kaplan, 434 A.2d 582 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (holding that fees collected
in winding up should be allocated according to percentages in partnership agreement);
Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1993) (holding that law firm partners may
impose reasonable costs on departing partners who compete with the law firm in a
limited geographic area).
63. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(a) (1949) (providing that in absence of an
agreement to the contrary, each partner has a right to share equally in profits).
64. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(f) (1996) (emphasis added).
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of payment must be client choice neutral for each client. If the
separation agreement creates a disincentive to accept representation, it violates Rule 5.6.
Several courts and state ethics opinions have condemned
separation agreements that require the departing lawyer to give
up too substantial a portion of the fees for work done on matters
for clients who chose the departing lawyer. The terms of
payment in such agreements have a negative effect on the
lawyer's decision to accept or to decline those clients who wish
to choose him or her as counsel.65
In contrast, the California Supreme Court in Howard v.
Babcock' cites with approval the commercial "no extra compensation rule" of partnership law. The court recognized that
compensating departing lawyers for winding up unfinished
partnership business according to their partnership interest "may
be just as much of a disincentive on the withdrawing partner to
continue to represent clients of the firm as an anticompetitive
penalty, and yet this is not considered to be a violation of Rule
1-500 [California's version of Rule 5.6] ."6'7
This is a commercial
reasonableness standard.
A Michigan decision, McCroskey, Feldman v. Waters,'

also

fails to apply the Rule 5.6 and its policy rationale of protecting
client choice to separation agreements allocating fees. The
departing lawyer's employment contract provided for a division
of fees to the firm ranging from twenty-five to seventy-five
percent (depending upon the stage of litigation of the file) on
clients who maintained a professional relationship with the
departing lawyer. The court upheld an arbitrator's decision,
finding that the contract provisions were "not so overreaching
65. See ABA & BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct (ABA & BNA)
51:1206-1207 (1995). See generally Kelly v. Smith, 611 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. 1993) (holding
that partnership was entitled to be compensated for services it provided prior to clients'
decision to follow withdrawing attorney); Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255
(Mass. 1989) (holding that partnership must be paid fair damage for removal of case
from the law firm); Leonard & Butler v. Harris, 653 A.2d 1193 (N.J. Super. Ct.App.
Div. 1995) (holding that employment contract requiring departing attorney to pay firm
for clients he took with him was unenforceable).
66. 863 P.2d 150.
67. Howard, 863 P.2d at 159 n.8. Justice Kennard in dissent notes that the

withdrawing partners had to pay 82.5% of the profits derived from the work the
withdrawing lawyers performed after the termination of the partnership. This restricts
the attorney's right to practice in any meaningful sense. Id. at 163.
68. 494 N.W.2d 826 (Mich. App. 1992).
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that they amount to an actual restriction on defendant's right to
practice law. Defendant's argument that the contract violates
MRPC 5.6 because his payments to the plaintiff decrease his new
firm's cash flow and thus impair its ability to service its clients is
unpersuasive."69 This is a commercial reasonableness standard.
The court does not address the critical question of the practical
effect of the terms of payment on the lawyer's decision to
decline or accept those clients who wish to choose him or her as
counsel.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Barna, Guzy & Steffen v.
Beens,7 ° discussed earlier in Part IV.B., correctly focused on the
effect of the terms of payment on the departing lawyer's decision
to decline or accept those clients who choose the lawyer as
counsel. However, the court did not properly apply the analysis
to the facts as explained earlier.
The critical focus of analysis must be whether the division
of fees when a lawyer is departing from a firm under Rule 1.5 (f)
is client choice neutral for each client. Clearly, when lawyers
divide fees on client files, they have fiduciary duties to account
for the fees and the fee division on each file separately, not on
an aggregate grouping of files. Even though voluntary settlements between a law firm and departing lawyers are to be
encouraged, the voluntary fee settlement should not aggregate
files in a way that may not be client choice neutral. The lawyers'
fiduciary duties to each client should trump the lawyers'
commercial interests in simplifying calculations for a voluntary
fee settlement. Each client must be considered separately to
determine the impact of the division of fees on client choice.
Departing or remaining lawyers are entitled to a portion of the
fee on each file based on the reasonable value of services
rendered or responsibility assumed.
VIII.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE OF A

SELLER OF A LAW PRACTICE UNDER RULE 1.17

Rule 1.17(f) provides that when a lawyer sells his or her

69. Id. at 828. See Kelly v. Smith, 588 N.E.2d 1306, 1313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
(focusing on adverse impacts on the firm in terms of lost client base as a result of a
lawyer's departure in approving a fee division under the UPA requiring the departing
lawyer to pay 80% of the fees received on removed matters to the firm).
70. 541 N.W.2d 354 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). See also supra text accompanying note
27 (discussing other aspects of the Barna, Guzy & Steffen noncompete agreement).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss4/6

20

1996]

Hamilton: Are
We a Profession or Merely a Business? The Erosion of Rule 5.6
ARE WE A PROFESSION OR MERELY
A BUSINESS?

1429

practice as an entirety, "the transaction may include a promise
by the selling lawyer that the selling lawyer will not engage in the
practice of law for a reasonable period within a reasonable
geographic area and will not advertise for or solicit clients within
that area for that time."71 The conditions of notification and
fee ceilings to protect clients that Rule 1.17 requires for a sale of
a law practice are substantially higher than general commercial
standards. Rule 1.17(f), following the policy of Rule 5.6(a)
regarding benefits upon retirement, recognizes that client choice
is not a factor in situations where the departing lawyer is no
longer in practice in the jurisdiction. Essentially, Rule 1.17
requires that a lawyer selling a practice "stay retired." The
purpose of this restriction, according to Hazard and Hodes, "is
to ensure that the sale is a genuine transfer of the goodwill
associated with the selling lawyer's client base, and to prevent a
lawyer from cultivating a series7 of
client bases for the purpose of
2
selling them off consecutively."
IX.

CONCLUSION

When a lawyer leaves a firm, there is disruption for the
client, the lawyer and the firm. The incidence of disruption is
dramatically increasing because of declining reciprocal loyalties
between firms and lawyers and the consequent increase in lawyer
mobility.
To protect their commercial interests, some firms are
experimenting with how far they can go to discourage competition by departing lawyers. The firms are using a variety of
creative financial disincentive provisions to let a firm's lawyers
know that there will be immediate negative consequences if the
lawyer leaves and goes into competition with the firm.
The major argument for these financial disincentives is that
the legal profession is at least in part, a commercial enterprise.
At a minimum, the law firm's legitimate interest in stability as an
enterprise and returns on its investments should be reasonably
balanced against the client's and departing lawyer's interests.
Although the practice of law is a commercial enterprise in
the sense that an attorney earns a living by practicing law, it is

71.
72.

MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.17 (1996).
HAzARD & HODES, supra note 10, at 824.1.
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also and foremost a client-oriented profession. 7 The Minnesota Attorney Oath of Admission and the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct emphasize that we are a profession
committed first to clients and to the court. The 1995 ABA
report, Teaching and Learning Professionalism, reaches back to
the traditional concept of professionalism. "As one noted
scholar has stated: 'profession' comes from the Latin,
professionem, meaning to make a public declaration. The term
evolved to describe occupations that required new entrants to
take an oath professing their dedication to the ideals and
practices associated with a learned calling." 74 The Minnesota
Attorney Oath of Admission provides:
I swear that I will support the Constitution of the United
States and that of the State of Minnesota, and will conduct
myself as an attorney and counselor at law, in an upright and
courteous manner, to the best of my learning and ability, with
all good fidelity as well to the court as to the client, and that
I will use no falsehood or deceit, nor delay any person's cause
for lucre or malice, so help me God.
The Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct begin with the
statement that "A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer
of the legal system and public citizen having special responsibility
for the quality of justice." 75 The first seven paragraphs of the
Preamble emphasize each of these roles, but especially the duties
of a lawyer as a representative of clients. The only reference to
the practice of law as a commercial enterprise in the Preamble
is in the middle of paragraph eight. "Virtually all difficult ethical
problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibility to
clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in
remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactory
76
living."
The legal profession has its own standards, differing from

those of other professions, deriving from the profession's role in
the justice system. In this justice system, the lawyer client
relationship is intensely personal; for the system to work, the

73. SeeHoward v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 161 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard,J., dissenting).
74. See AMERICAN BARASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSION TO
THE BAR PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE, TEACHING & LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, 6-7
(1995) (hereinafter TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM).
75. MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Preamble (1996).
76. Id.
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lawyer in the role of counselor and advocate must enjoy the
maximum possible trust and confidence of the client.7 7 The
client must have free choice of counsel who enjoys the client's
maximum trust and confidence. Our society's goal that our
adversary system results in our best approximation of justice
depends upon the trust in the lawyer client relationship.
Lawyers act as the alter ego of the client to effectuate justice in
our adversary system. The importance of the role of the lawyerclient relationship in securing justice for the society is why the
judge in Dwyer v. Jung emphasizes, "[t]he attorney-client
relationship is consensual, highly fiduciary on the part of
counsel, and he [or she] may do nothing which restricts the
right of a client to repose confidence in any counsel of his [or
her] choice .... No concept in the practice of law is more
deeply rooted." 8 While the client in other professional relationships like the doctor patient relationship may benefit
personally from trust with the service provider, there is not the
same overarching societal goal ofjustice and system justification
in those relationships.
There are clearly forces within the society that are pushing
the legal profession towards being more profit-centered than
client-centered.
The monetization of professional values
continues to erode the ethics of the profession.79 This erosion
must be reversed.
For these reasons, the focus of analysis concerning disruption by an attorney leaving a law firm should not be upon the
battle among commercial interests of the law firm or the
departing attorney, but rather upon the client. The focus of
analysis must be whether commercial arrangements among the
lawyers are client choice neutral. If the agreement between the
law firm and the lawyer in practical effect creates a disincentive
for a lawyer to accept or continue representation, it violates Rule
5.6.
The greatest threat to client choice is clearly to the client
who may wish to choose the departing lawyer as counsel. While
the partnership or employment agreement could, in theory,

77. See Mark H. Epstein & Brandon Wisoff, Winding Up Dissolved Law Partnerships:
The No Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1597, 160-04 (1985).
78. Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (citation
omitted).
79. See TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supranote 74, at 4.
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influence the client choice of either the departing lawyer or of
the lawyers remaining in the firm, the practical reality is that
established firms draft these financial disincentive provisions to
serve their interests by discouraging competition and reducing
client choice.
There may be a subset of situations where the firm has
incurred such high fixed costs of mutually incurred debt and the
departing lawyer will take so many clients, that the firm would,
for financial reasons, choose to withdraw from representation of
an existing client. This does not seem a realistic probability.
There may also be situations where the firm, in computing
a withdrawing partner's equity interest, should be able to
account for the effect of a partner's departure on the firm's
value. In Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, the New Jersey
Supreme Court noted that "Although the departing attorneys
always have a right to receive the value of their capital accounts,
in computing the value of any additional interest they have in
the firm, the value they contributed can be offset by the decrease
in the firm's value their departure causes."s° Although the New
Jersey court apparently endorses accounting for decreases in
prospective business from specific clients, this approach may
create disincentives for the departing lawyer to take specific
clients. The focus of the analysis should be whether such
provisions are client choice neutral. The computation of the
effect of a departure on firm goodwill will not prejudice client
choice if it is not based on particular clients, but rather on an
aggregate or average like the average loss of goodwill from
81
partner withdrawals.
Far more likely is the situation where the departing lawyer

80. 607 A.2d 142, 152 (NJ. 1992).
81. In Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, the firm's agreement provided
several types of payments to departing parmers: repayment of capital, distribution of
undistributed net profits, and supplemental payments upon withdrawal or death of a
multiple of the withdrawing partner's percentage of the firm's profits. Hackett v.
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 630 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276 (N.Y. 1995).
The
supplemental payments were, "reduced dollar for dollar to the extent that the
withdrawing partner's annual earned income, from any source, exceed [ed] $100,000."
Id. at 277. The arbitrator found that the purpose of the reduction in supplemental
payments was not anti-competitive but rather the provision of a safety net for lawyers
who leave for lower income positions. The New York Court of Appeals, giving much
deference to the arbitrator, endorsed the arbitrator's finding that the provision is
"competition neutral," because the provision did not discriminate based on competition.
Id. at 280. Client choice neutral would be a better criterion than "competition neutral."
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is faced with all the costs of starting a new firm, and the financial
disincentives for competition with the old firm created by the
partnership, employment, or separation agreement create a
dilemma whether to decline or accept a client. In most cases,
given the difference in asset base between the established firm
and the departing lawyer, delay and litigation will deter competition and play into the hands of the established firm.
If courts adopt a balancing of interests approach or a
commercial rule of reason approach to restrictions on the right
to practice, they will cause further erosion of the freedom of
clients to select counsel of their choice. Courts must be vigilant
to prevent this erosion. Such an approach will also increase
rather than decrease litigation as firms explore the outer edge
of the envelope of "reasonableness" in trying to restrict competition from departing lawyers. A simple rule with clear lines will
best prevent erosion of client choice and more litigation. The
critical question is the practical effect of the terms of payment
on the lawyer's decision to decline or accept those clients who
wish to choose him or her as counsel. If an agreement creates
any disincentive to accept representation, it violates Rule 5.6. In
cases of doubt, public policy should prevail against the financial
disincentive.
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